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Introduction
Policy-makers and economists agree that pro…t shifting activities by multinational enterprises substantially reduce the tax revenue of high-tax countries. Accordingly, there is political pressure to implement e¤ective measures to limit the size and the importance of tax havens. The European Commission has therefore proposed to replace the current system of separate accounting (SA) by a system with an EUwide consolidated tax base. This tax base would be allocated to the member states according to some formula ('formula apportionment', henceforth FA). Each member state would apply the national statutory tax rate to its part of the tax base.
Under an FA regime, avoiding taxes by standard pro…t-shifting devices like transfer prices or debt …nancing is ruled out. But pro…t shifting to non-union tax havens is still possible. In this paper, we analyze enforcement behavior by national (i.e. decentralized) …scal authorities before and after the introduction of an FA system.
The EU member states currently debate over the question of whether or not tax administration should be centralized or coordinated. An EU working group states: "The basic principle expressed in the Commission Services' papers was that harmonising the rules for calculating the corporate tax base does not require an overall harmonisation of the tax administration and procedural rules" (EU-Commission (2006b)). However, there is growing attention to this question as a recent survey under the EU member states shows: "[I]t seems that there are two orientations: some Member States are more favourable to a centralised management of the common tax base (a single tax return, a single audit mechanism, a single interpretation forum etc.), while some other Member States would prefer that (...) each Member State audits the entities which are residents within their jurisdictions" (EU-Commission (2006b)). The member states which demand a centralized tax administration vis-a-vis the common consolidated tax base are concerned by a "scope for tax planning by choosing an administration with the most generous procedural rules" and support a "common approach to some elements of the audit procedure, for example, a common maximum length of the audit or common statute of limitation" (EU-Commission (2006a) ).
Apparently, these member states are aware that a decentralized enforcement system could yield ine¢ cient results because the incentives for tax enforcement are distorted. The analysis in this paper supports this view. We show that, under SA, the level of enforcement vis-a-vis pro…t-shifting within the union is ine¢ ciently high. The reason is that enforcement of tax payments reduces the tax revenue of the tax haven within the union. This negative …scal externality is not taken into account by the …scal authority in the non-haven country. In contrast, under FA, enforcement of taxes shifted to non-union tax havens is ine¢ ciently low in our model. If the tax base is consolidated, then the enforcement return in terms of additional tax revenue has to be shared with other member states. This positive …scal externality yields enforcement levels which are too low compared to the optimal level for the union as a whole. Thus, the idea that introducing FA is an e¤ective way to solve the problem of income shifting has to be quali…ed. Shifting within the union will disappear but the problem of shifting to third countries becomes more severe. Our results also challenge recent contributions arguing that, under FA, there is a tendency towards ine¢ ciently high levels of tax rates. If statutory tax rates increase and enforcement decreases, it is a priori undetermined whether the e¤ective tax rate on business pro…ts rises or falls.
The importance of international income shifting is documented by a growing empirical literature, see e.g. Hines and Rice (1994) as well as the recent contribution by Huizinga and Laeven (2005) . As a consequence, corporate taxes give rise to a positive …scal externality, i.e. increasing tax rates in one country lead to rising tax revenues in the other country. Implementing an FA system can abolish this …scal externality, see McLure (1980 ), Mintz (1999 and Devereux (2004) . Empirical estimations of how an FA system would a¤ect the tax revenues of EU member countries is provided by Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb (2007) and by Devereux and Loretz (2007) . In both studies, the authors …nd that the FA system would lead to a substantial redistribution of tax revenues among the member states.
Next to these empirical approaches, there is a growing body of theoretical literature on the incentive e¤ects imposed by an FA system. The literature can be classi…ed according to its time perspective. McLure (1980 ), Mintz (1999 , Mintz and Smart (2004) and Nielsen, Raimondos-Møller and Schjelderup (2003) consider pro…t shifting in models where capital stocks are …xed. This can be referred to as short-run perspective. In contrast, Gordon and Wilson (1986) , Pethig and Wagener (forthcoming) and Eggert and Schjelderup (2003) analyze the e¤ects of FA when the size of capital stocks is endogenous, i.e. the long-run perspective. In this paper, we will analyze the incentive e¤ects of SA and FA systems on enforcement activities by national …scal authorities when capital stocks are endogenous, i.e. in the long run.
Our approach can be seen as part of a literature that examines external e¤ects of national tax policies. With regard to the implementation of an FA system, similar approaches can be found in Nielsen, Raimondos-Møller and Schjelderup (2004) , Sørensen (2004) and Riedel and Runkel (2007) . The main argument in this literature goes as follows. In the presence of internationally mobile capital, national tax policies have external e¤ects on the tax revenue and the tax policies of other countries. The introduction of an FA system may change the sign and the importance of these e¤ects. For example, whereas tax competition leads to ine¢ ciently low levels of corporate taxes under an SA system, the FA system may lead to ine¢ ciently high levels of corporate taxation.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to discuss the problem of optimal tax enforcement in a setting with formula apportionment. Enforcement issues in general are discussed in Cowell (2004) and Slemrod (2004) . Optimal enforcement of corporate taxes is considered in Peralta, Wauthy and Ypersele (2006) as well as in Hong and Smart (2007) . Both contributions claim that it may be optimal to reduce enforcement of taxes on multinational enterprises. Slemrod and Wilson (2006) show in a di¤erent framework that it is always optimal to shut down some tax havens. Bucovetsky and Hau ‡er (forthcoming) hint at potential distortions which may arise from loopholes for multinational …rms. If …rms decide on their organizational form, i.e. whether being a multinational or a national company, these loopholes may lead to an excessive number of multinational …rms and e¢ciency losses. Cremer and Gahvari (2000) as well as Stöwhase and Traxler (2005) discuss enforcement issues in a tax competition framework. None of these papers consider enforcement policies in a setting with a consolidated corporate tax base, though.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent contribution by Riedel and Runkel (2007) . These authors analyze the e¤ects of introducing an FA system when there are tax havens which are not subject to the FA regime. They …nd that there may be ine¢ cient overtaxation due to a negative externality of corporate taxation. Our argument is diametrically opposed. Since tax enforcement has a positive externality on the tax revenue of other countries, tax enforcement may be ine¢ ciently low, which may lead to e¤ective tax rates that are too low from an e¢ ciency point of view.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze tax policy and enforcement strategies under separate entity accounting. Section 3 introduces formula apportionment. In section 4, an extension of the model is discussed where pro…t shifting opportunities depend on real investment levels. Section 5 concludes.
A model with separate entity accounting
In this section, we analyse a model where pro…ts of multinational …rms are taxed according to the separate entity accounting principle (SA). We provide an analysis of optimal tax issues and derive welfare e¤ects of coordinating enforcement policies.
The model setup
Consider two small countries, called the home country and the foreign country, which form a union. The union is small in the the sense that it faces a perfectly elastic supply of capital from the rest of the world with an exogenously given rental price of r. Moreover, there is a tax haven outside the union which o¤ers possibilities of income shifting to …rms operating in the union.
The assumption that capital demand from the union does not a¤ect r is made because it allows us to focus on …scal externalities transmitted through pro…t shifting and enforcement directed against this shifting. If the union had market power in the international capital market, additional …scal externalities would arise and be transmitted through the interest rate channel. For instance, individual member states would neglect that a reduction in their tax rate would drive up the interest rate and reduce real investment in other member states of the union. These …scal externalities have been studied extensively in the literature. Including them in our model is possible but makes the analysis more complicated without adding additional insights.
Private households
The home country and the foreign country are populated by many identical and immobile households. For notational simplicity, the number of households per country is normalized to unity. The representative domestic household derives utility from private consumption C and publicly provided goods G. The utility function is U (C; G) and has the usual neoclassical properties. The household is endowed with savings S and owns a share 0 1 of the multinational …rm. There are no residence based taxes on capital income. Private consumption is given by
where sa denotes the pro…t of the multinational …rm under SA. The foreign household is modelled equivalently. The …rm may be partially or entirely owned by households residing outside the union, i.e. 0 + 1, where is the foreign household's ownership share in the multinational …rm. Henceforth, the denotes the location in the foreign country.
Firms
There is a representative multinational …rm operating in the union. The …rm invests K in the domestic country and K in the foreign country. It produces an output of F (K) and F (K ) in the domestic and the foreign country, respectively. Capital is the only factor of production. The production functions F (K) and F (K ) have decreasing returns to scale, i.e. F KK < 0 < F K and F K K < 0 < F K . Pro…ts of the multinational …rm before taxes are
In this paper, we compare two systems for the taxation of multinational …rms: separate entity accounting and formula apportionment. Under both tax systems, …rms react to taxation i) by adjusting their real investment decisions and ii) by shifting book pro…ts from high to low tax countries.
Under SA, taxable pro…ts are determined and taxed separately for each country. "True" taxable pro…ts generated in the home country are given by F (K). The …nancing costs rK are not deductible, i.e. we assume investment to be …nanced by equity.
Firms may manipulate their book pro…ts by employing transfer pricing and other pro…t shifting methods. We model income shifting as follows. Firstly, …rms may shift income s within the union, from the home country to the foreign country and vice versa. Shifted income s is a function of two variables. Firstly, it depends on government enforcement , which will be explained in greater detail below. Secondly, it depends on expenditures of the …rm denoted by a (a ), which can be interpreted as expenditure on e.g. tax advisor services, e¤ort etc. Shifting is thus given by s = s (a; ) with s aa < 0 < s a . 1 In the following, will focus on equilibria where , which implies that the direction of income shifting is from the home country to the foreign country, and a = s = 0.
Secondly, …rms may shift income to a tax haven outside the union. For notational simplicity, we assume that the tax rate of the tax haven outside the union is equal to zero. Income e (e ) shifted from the home (foreign) country to the haven outside the union depends on resources the …rm spends on shifting activity b, and government enforcement expenditure directed against this speci…c type of shifting denoted by , i.e. e = e (b; ) with e bb < 0 < e b . Income from both the domestic and the foreign location will be shifted to the tax haven.
Thus, the after-tax pro…ts of the multinational …rm are given by
In the literature, it is often argued that income shifting and investment interact, e.g. that income shifting is easier if the capital stock is higher etc. In section 4 we analyze income shifting which depends on capital stocks K and K . 1 The precise properties of the shifting function will be explained further below. 6
Governments
The corporate income tax is the only source of revenue. In order to increase tax revenues governments may increase taxes or take measures against income shifting by spending resources on enforcement activities. As mentioned in the preceding section, enforcement expenditure per unit of capital directed against intra union shifting is denoted by ( ) and enforcement expenditure per unit of capital directed against shifting to the tax haven outside the union is denoted by ( ).
Thus, the budget constraint of the home country government is given by
Note that we continue to assume that the home country tax rate is at least as high as the tax rate of the foreign country, so that no income shifting occurs from the foreign country to the home country. The budget constraint of the foreign government is
Increasing drives down the income shifted s (a; ) by the multinational …rm:
Equilibrium investment and shifting behavior
The sequence of decisions is as follows. At the …rst stage, the governments simultaneously set their tax rates ; and their enforcement expenditures ; ; . At the second stage, the …rm chooses the levels of real investment K; K and avoidance activities a; b; b to maximize pro…ts. Optimal investment is implied by
With respect to income shifting acitivities, optimality is given by
The …rm's shifting behavior is therefore described by the functions a = a( ; ), b = b( ; ), and b = b ( ; ). Note that an increase in enforcement expenditures may trigger more or less avoidance expenditure by …rms. It follows from (7) that da d = s sa . Since s aa < 0, the sign of da d is equal to the sign of s a , which depends on the functional form of s (a; ).
In the following, we make the following
Assumption 1 implies that an increase in enforcement , will also succeed in reducing the amount of income shifting inputs a,b.
Tax and enforcement policies under separate entity accounting
Governments of both countries are assumed to maximize their residents' utility, given by U (C; G), subject to the public and private sector budget constraints in (1) and (4). Consider …rst the home country. The …rst order condition for the tax rate can be expressed as
The …rst term on the left hand side of (8) re ‡ects that a higher tax rate shifts income from the private to the public sector. If the degree of foreign …rm ownership is high, i.e. is small, the cost of the tax increase in terms of private consumption is weighted less because it is borne by foreigners. The second term re ‡ects that higher taxes a¤ect real domestic investment and income shifting activities and, hence, the corporate tax base.
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Optimal taxes are therefore given by
The optimal tax rate rises in the degree of foreign …rm ownership (decreasing ), the relative valuation of public goods relative to private goods and the size of the tax base. It is lower the more elastic the capital stock and the avoidance activities react to a marginal increase in .
The …rst order condition for enforcement directed against tax havens inside the union ( ) is given by
More enforcement reduces private bene…ts from pro…t shifting and increases tax revenue by reducing income shifting, as the …rst term on the left hand side of (10) shows. The second term stands for the behavioral e¤ects of increasing on the shifting choice a and the direct cost of enforcement.
Optimal enforcement of intra-union income shifting is therefore given by
Henceforth, " x;y denotes the elasticity of x with respect to small changes in y: " x;y = @x @y y x . The optimal choice of increases in the amount of tax revenue the government loses due to income shifting, s, and in the magnitude of the behavioral elasticities.
The …rst order condition for enforcement directed against tax havens outside the union is given by
The interpretation of this …rst order condition is analogous to the condition for 9 . Optimal enforcement of income shifting to non-union tax havens is given by
Again, the optimal choice of rises in the government's loss of tax revenue, e, and the behavioral elasticities. The tax policy of the foreign country faces similar trade-o¤s. The main di¤erence is that the foreign country bene…ts from income shifting within the union and does nothing against this type of shifting.
Welfare implications of uncoordinated tax and enforcement policies
In this section, we ask whether the decentrally implemented enforcement policies are e¢ cient for the union as a whole. If this is the case, there would be no reason for coordination of enforcement policies. But as we will show below, national enforcement policies give rise to …scal externalities, which make policy coordination welfare enhancing.
We analyse this issue by considering small changes in enforcement expenditures, departing from the equilibrium without policy coordination. We start by considering the e¤ect of a small increase in the domestic corporate tax rate holding constant enforcement expenditures. With optimally chosen from the domestic point of view, it follows that U = 0. The e¤ect on the welfare of the foreign country is
The …rst term re ‡ects the externality of domestic taxation on the foreign household's consumption opportunities which is given for > 0. This foreign …rm ownership externality has …rst been derived by Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) . The second term is the well-known positive …scal externality of domestic taxation on foreign tax revenue, resulting from an increased income shifting as a response to higher domestic taxes. In sum, the e¤ect of on U has an ambiguous sign. Now consider the e¤ects of home country enforcement. A small change in home country enforcement against intra union income shifting, departing from the equilibrium without coordination, has no e¤ect on home country welfare because the equilibrium without coordination is characterized by U = 0, according to eq. (10). The e¤ect on the welfare of the foreign country is
An increase in enforcement expenditure gives rise to two negative …scal externalities. Firstly, it reduces the after tax pro…ts of the multinational …rm. If the foreign household owns part of the …rm, > 0, this gives rise to a negative …scal externality. The second negative externality arises because income shifting from the home country to the foreign country declines. When determining its enforcement policy, the home country does not take into account these negative e¤ects on the foreign country's tax revenue.
How do enforcement expenditures of the home country directed against tax havens outside the union a¤ect the foreign household's utility? The e¤ect of a marginal change in enforcement expenditure on the welfare of the foreign country is given by
Again, there is the negative e¤ect on after tax pro…ts accruing to the …rm owners residing in the foreign country. If, however, there is no foreign …rm ownership, = 0, then there is no external e¤ect on foreign welfare. Whereas the foreign country has no need to enforce intra-union shifting (i.e. = 0), the external e¤ect of enforcement in the case of non-union tax haven shifting is symmetric, i.e. dU d = U C K e < 0. These results may be summarized as Proposition 1 Under SA, given that ; > 0, and assuming that > , expenditure on tax enforcement directed against both intra union income shifting ( ) and income shifting to countries outside the union ( ; ) is ine¢ ciently high.
It thus turns out that, in a tax regime where corporate taxation is based on SA and where countries set their enforcement policies independently, there is a general tendency towards too much tax enforcement. This does not only apply to enforcement directed against intra union shifting but also to enforcement directed against shifting to third countries. Put di¤erently, the union would gain from a coordinated reduction in tax enforcement. 3 However, note that excessive enforcement does not necessarily lead to an overprovision of public goods. It follows from equation (8) 
Otherwise, the optimal tax rate is zero. If = 0, though, there is no tax avoidance and no enforcement. Therefore, underprovision of public goods and excessive enforcement coexist. 4
Introducing Formula Apportionment
We now assume that the pro…ts of the representative multinational …rm generated within the union are taxed on the basis of formula apportionment: Taxable pro…ts will …rst be determined on a national basis and then consolidated (i.e. here: summed up) for all member countries of the union. The common consolidated tax base is then allocated to the individual member states according to some formula.
The factors entering the formula usually include indicators of real economic activity such as the payroll, property or sales. In the following, we assume that the share allocated to each country depends on the capital stock invested in the two countries. The share of the tax base allocated to the home country is denoted by (K; K ), with K > 0 and K < 0. Accordingly, the share allocated to the foreign country is given by 1 . Each state applies the national tax rate to its part of the tax base.
Tax enforcement continues to be decentralized. Tax enforcement a¤ects the determination of taxable pro…ts at the national level, before they are consolidated and allocated at the union level. Pro…ts generated in the rest of the world are still allocated on the basis of SA.
Changes in the model setup
Households are not or only indirectly a¤ected by the introduction of the FA system. Firms and governments, however, face a substantial change in their incentive schemes.
Firms
The consolidation of the tax base implies that shifting income via transfer prices from one country within the union to the other does not a¤ect tax payments, i.e. the incentive for intra union income shifting vanishes. Income shifting to tax havens outside the union, in contrast, still allows …rms to reduce their tax burden.
After tax pro…ts of the multinational …rm under FA are given by
where t + (1 ) is the weighted combination of the two national tax rates, with = (K; K ), which determines the e¤ective statutory tax burden on the …rm's income.
Government
Under FA, the budget constraint of the home country government is given by
Accordingly, the budget constraint of the foreign country is
The di¤erence to the SA case is twofold. Firstly, the corporate tax of both countries is now grounded on the unionwide tax base. This implies that income shifting from the foreign country to tax havens outside the union c.p. reduces domestic tax revenue and vice versa. Secondly, the share of the unionwide tax base allocated to each country depends on the distribution of investment across the two countries. This is re ‡ected by the weight (K; K ): In the next subsection, we derive the optimal tax and enforcement policies.
Equilibrium investment and shifting behavior
The sequence of decisions is the same as in the SA case. At the …rst stage, the governments simultaneously set their tax rates ( ; ) and their enforcement expenditures ( ; ). At the second stage, the …rm chooses the levels of real investment (K; K ) and avoidance activities (b; b ) to maximize pro…ts.
Optimal investment is given by
This means that the …rm's investment behavior is described by the functions K = K( ; ; ; ) and K = K ( ; ; ; ). Optimal income shifting to nonunion tax havens implies
Therefore the …rm's shifting behavior is given by the functions b = b( ; ; ; ) and b = b ( ; ; ; ).
Under FA, the e¤ects of taxes and enforcement activity on investment and income shifting become far more complex than in the SA case. In general, the e¤ects of changes in tax rates and tax enforcement on shifting and investment behavior are ambiguous. But for the symmetric case, we show in the appendix that 
Tax and enforcement policies under formula apportionment
As in the SA case, the governments of both countries are assumed to maximize the utility of their residents and take the policy of the other country as given. Consider …rst the home country. The f.o.c. for the tax rate is
where T = F (K) + F (K ) e e is the consolidated tax base. The …rst term on the r.h.s. captures the welfare gain of a redistribution of income between the private and the public sphere. The other terms represent the e¤ects on …rm behavior: Increasing the tax rate leads to more income shifting and reduces the capital stocks K and K . The optimal tax rate is given by
As before, the optimal rises in the degree of foreign …rm ownership (decreasing ), the relative valuation of public goods relative to private goods and the size of the tax base T . It is lower the more elastic the domestic capital stock and the more avoidance activities react to a marginal increase in . The third term in the denominator is ambiguous, though. Increasing may a¤ect the optimal choice of K but the e¤ect has no clear sign.
The interpretation of this …rst order condition is as follows. The …rst term on the right hand side of (25) stands for the decline in after tax pro…ts accruing to the domestic household caused by an increase in . The second term represents the e¤ect of more domestic enforcement on pro…t shifting to the tax haven outside the 15 union. The third term re ‡ects the change in the budgetary costs of enforcement.
Optimal enforcement activity is therefore given by
where " e; ; " b; < 0 and " e;b > 0 are elasticities (see above). In comparison to equation (13), this shows that the design of optimal enforcement policies under FA is more complex that under SA. The main reason is that the two countries share a common tax base and allocate the right to tax this base using a factor which is itself in ‡uenced by tax policy. This suggests that …scal externalities caused by enforcement policies are also more complex. We will analyse this issue in the next subsection.
Welfare implications of uncoordinated policies under FA
As in the SA case, we ask whether the enforcement policies implemented by the individual countries under FA are e¢ cient for the union as a whole. We analyse this issue by considering small changes in tax rates and enforcement expenditures, departing from the equilibrium without policy coordination. If we allow for asymmetries, the welfare e¤ects or coordination are in general ambiguous. We therefore focus on the case of symmetry.
Starting with the tax rate, a small increase in , departing from a symmetric equilibrium, and holding constant enforcement expenditure, has no e¤ect on domestic welfare since has already been chosen optimally. Its e¤ect on foreign welfare is given by
The …rst term on the r.h.s. is the e¤ect resulting from foreign …rm ownership: An increase in reduces the after-tax income from holding shares in the multinational …rm. The second term re ‡ects the e¤ect of a tax rate increase on income shifting. Since income shifting increases, the foreign country su¤ers a tax revenue loss. The third term and the fourth term include the e¤ects of the induced changes in K and K on the size of the common tax base and the share allocated to the foreign country. These terms have an ambiguous sign because the expressions in brackets may be positive or negative. The overall e¤ect of an increase in the domestic tax rate on foreign welfare is thus ambiguous. This is in line with results derived in the literature for models without endogenous enforcement policies, see e.g. Nielsen et al. (2004) .
Next, we focus on the welfare e¤ect of a small change in home country enforcement , departing from the equilibrium without coordination and holding constant the tax rate. The change in has no e¤ect on home country welfare because the equilibrium without coordination is characterized by U (C; G) = 0, see eq. (25). The e¤ect on the welfare of the foreign country is
Firstly, more domestic enforcement reduces after tax pro…ts of the multinational …rm and thus reduces the income of the foreign household. This negative externality also occurs in the SA case. Secondly, more domestic enforcement increases the tax base shared by the two countries, given the behavior of the …rm. This gives rise to a positive …scal externality. Using the …rst order condition for the optimal enforcement policy of the foreign country under symmetry in (25), we can express the above equation as
Thus, in an uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium, enforcement expenditures are ine¢ ciently low. This may stated as Proposition 2 Under FA, and assuming a symmetric uncoordinated equilibrium, expenditure on tax enforcement directed against income shifting to countries outside the union ( ; ) is ine¢ ciently low.
For the case of symmetric countries, it thus turns out that the result on the e¢ ciency of tax enforcement directed against tax havens outside the union is diametrically opposed to the result derived under SA. Under SA, the overenforcement result emerges because countries do not take into account that their tax enforcement directed against third country tax havens reduces the pro…ts accruing to residents of the other union country. Given that all bene…ts accrue to the country determining the enforcement, the emerging enforcement level is unambiguously too high. Under FA, it is also true that more enforcement in one country reduces the pro…t income of households residing in other countries. But, some additional …scal externalities arise. In particular, national enforcement activities a¤ect the common tax base and the division of the tax base between the national …scal authorities. This is intuitive in so far as the budgetary costs of enforcement are fully borne by the country deciding on the enforcement level whereas the bene…ts in the form of a larger tax base spread over the entire union.
Extension: Enforcement policy when investment and income shifting interact
In this section, we brie ‡y discuss whether our results are robust when income shifting depends on the distribution of investment across the two member countries of the union. In the literature it is often argued that investment and income shifting should not be modelled as being separable. It is rather assumed that they interact, i.e. that the larger the stock of capital K the easier it is for the …rm to shift income to the tax haven. We therefore change the above presented model as follows. Income shifting is now modelled as a fraction of a capital unit K. Firms spend aK and bK (b K ) in order to shift sK and eK (e K ) to the intra-union and non-union tax havens, respectively.
Thus, the modi…ed multinational's pro…t function is given by
Investment behavior is di¤erent now since it interacts with income shifting. Optimal investment is given by
Optimal income shifting activities are given by e b = 1 and e b = 1 which are the same expressions as in the previous sections. Using this, it is straightforward to show that, given > 0 and > , the cost of capital is increasing in enforcement expenditures and . Moreover, the impact of a change in the domestic tax rate on the cost of capital (given optimal shifting behavior) is = 1 (s+e) 1 . In the following, we assume that tax e¤ects are in the relevant range:
> 0. Again, the government is supposed to maximize welfare U = U (C; G) subject to
The main di¤erence between equations (34) and (12) is that enforcement now a¤ects investment. It follows from (31) that K < 0.
The e¤ect of a marginal change in enforcement expenditure on the welfare of the foreign country is given by
Again, there is a tendency towards overenforcement in the SA case. Similar results can be derived for the intra-union shifting.
Under FA, after tax pro…ts of the multinational …rm under formula apportion-ment f a are given by f a = (F (K) + F (K )) (1 t) r(K + K ) + t (eK + e K ) bK b K (36) Under FA, the budget constraint of the home country government is given by
where T is the consolidated tax base. With respect to income shifting to nonunion tax havens, optimality is implied by e b = 1 t and e b = 1 t , as in the previous section. It is straight-forward to show that, in the symmetric case with = , K < 0 and K = 0 which will be used later on.
Next, we focus on the welfare e¤ect of a small change small change in home country enforcement , departing from the equilibrium without coordination. We directly focus on the symmetric case. The e¤ect on the welfare of the foreign country is
Using the foreign equivalent of (39) in the symmetry case, we can express (40) as
where " K ; = K K is the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the enforcement level . Assuming " K ; > 1 simply means that increasing the enforcement level e¤ectively increases the expenditures for enforcement K . Thus, in an uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium, enforcement expenditures are ine¢ ciently low, i.e. the positive …scal externalities dominate.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that, under separate accounting, governments have the incentive to overspend on tax enforcement directed against income shifting to tax havens. In contrast, under formula apportionment, there may be underenforcement. The reason is that enforcement gives rise to various …scal externalities which are not accounted for in decentralized policy making.
Interestingly, our results stand in contrast to recent contributions which analyze the incentive e¤ects for tax rate setting. These studies show that under FA, tax rates may be set too high. This can be replicated in our model. Ine¢ ciently high tax rates and ine¢ ciently low enforcement may result in e¤ective over-or undertaxation. Which of the two countervailing e¤ects prevails crucially depends on the functional form of shifting cost functions, enforcement costs etc.
What are the policy implications of our analysis? One important implication is that introducing formula apportionment for the taxation of corporate pro…ts in the EU will change the incentives of governments to act against pro…t shifting in a signi…cant way. Under the current system, these incentives are strong, too strong according to our analysis. A switch to formula apportionment would lead to the opposite situation. If tax enforcement directed against income shifting is left to the discretion of the member states, underenforcement has to be expected. In so far, the concerns expressed by some member states quoted in the introduction are supported by our results.
Another important policy issue is the impact of formula apportionment on the e¤ective tax burden faced by …rms. Under the current SA system, there is a trend towards lower tax rates, broader tax bases and stricter tax enforcement. The German corporate tax reform 2008, which reduces tax rates but imposes severe restrictions on income shifting via debt or royalties is a good example.
Under formula apportionment, the pressure to reduce tax rates will be smaller, but incentives to stabilize the domestic tax base will be much weaker, so that national tax policies may return to higher tax rates and less rigid enforcement. It is even possible that lax enforcement becomes a key instrument in tax competition because the legal de…nition of the tax base would have to be harmonized before FA is introduced.
The likely trend towards underenforcement also suggests that the e¤ective tax burden under FA will not necessarily be higher than under SA. Of course, an obvious solution to the problem of underenforcement would be to coordinate enforcement policies. But the implementation of EU-wide standards for tax enforcement is probably much more di¢ cult in practice than the introduction of common rules for the determination of company pro…ts or common tax rates.
